The pathways, through which water quality in the distribution network can be compromised, may be classified into five categories: intrusion of contaminants into the distribution system (e.g., through cross connection), regrowth of bacteria in pipes and distribution storage tanks, water treatment breakthrough, leaching of chemicals or corrosion products from system components (pipes, tanks, liners, etc.) and permeation of organic compounds through plastic pipe and pipe components in the system. Quantification and characterization of the various risk factors in water distribution systems is a difficult task. Many kilometers of pipes of different ages and materials, uncertain operational and environmental conditions, unavailability of reliable data, and lack of understanding of some factors and processes affecting pipe performance make it extremely challenging. It is often difficult to identify or validate specific cause(s) for water contamination or waterborne disease outbreak because real-time data are rarely, if ever, available. For these reasons, high uncertainties are inherent in any risk measure that may be assigned to the distribution system. Further, the current inability to precisely quantify most of these risks may warrant the usage of a quantitative-qualitative framework.
Introduction
The safety of drinking water is the supreme priority of water utilities and other water industry stakeholders. Total water quality management (TWQM) using multi-barrier approach (Health Canada 2002) and hazard analysis critical control points (HACCP) (Hulebak and Schlosser 2002) are two main concepts gaining popularity in the management of drinking water. A typical modern water supply system comprises the water source (aquifer or surface water source including the catchment basin), transmission mains, treatment plant and distribution network which includes pipes and distribution tanks. While water quality can be compromised at any component, failure at the distribution level can be extremely critical because it is closest to the point of delivery and, with the exception of a rare filtering device at the consumer level, there are virtually no safety barriers before consumption. Water quality failures (compromising either the safety or the aesthetics of water) in distribution networks can generally be classified into the following major categories (Kleiner 1998) , also schematically described in Figure 1 :
Intrusion of contaminants into the distribution system through system components whose integrity was compromised or through misuse;
Regrowth of microorganisms in the distribution network; Microbial (and chemicals) breakthrough and byproducts and residual chemicals from water treatment plant;
Leaching of chemicals and corrosion products from system components into the water; and Permeation of organic compounds from the soil through system components into the water supplies.
The quantification of contamination risk in water distribution systems is a difficult task. Water distribution systems comprise many (sometimes thousands) of kilometers of pipes of different ages and various materials. The operational and environmental conditions are highly variable and particularly dependent on pipe location. Further, pipes are buried structures, therefore limited performance and deterioration data are available. Finally, some of the failure processes are not well understood and forensic investigation of contamination is very difficult for water Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks distribution system because there is generally a time lag between the time of failure and the time at which the consequences (e.g., outbreaks) are observed. Rowe (1977) defines risk as the potential for unwanted negative consequences of an event or an activity, whereas Lawrence (1976) defines it as a measure of probability and severity of negative adverse effects. In this context, risk analysis is the estimation of the frequency and physical consequences of undesirable events, which can produce harm (Ricci et al. 1981) . Therefore, risk refers to the joint probabilities of an occurrence of an event and its consequences. When a complex system involves various contributory risk items with uncertain sources and magnitudes, it often can not be treated with mathematical rigor during the initial or screening phase of decision-making (Lee 1996) .
The objective of this paper is to describe a hierarchical model for the evaluation of an aggregative (cumulative) risk of water quality failure in distribution network. The model is termed hierarchical because it permits the breakdown of the aggregate risk in terms of the individual risk items. A qualitative (linguistic) modeling technique that combines fuzzy set theory with analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is proposed. Water quality deterioration caused by various internal and external sources is incorporated in the proposed model. The benefits as well as the limitations of this approach are discussed with recommendations for future research.
In the following sections, some fundamentals of fuzzy set theory (FST) are presented, and a generic hierarchical structure model for aggregative risk analysis and knowledge acquisition process is also discussed. Later in this paper, the proposed framework is applied to water quality failure in distribution networks using a simplified structure of risk hierarchies to demonstrate its scope of application. The benefits and limitations of the proposed framework as well as recommendations for future research are also discussed. Summary and conclusions of this research are provided in the end.
Soft Computing: Fuzzy-based Risk Concept
The term soft computing describes an array of emerging techniques such as fuzzy logic, probabilistic reasoning, neural networks, and genetic algorithms. All these techniques are essentially heuristic which provide rational, reasoned out solutions for complex real-world Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks problems (Bonissone 1997) . Quantitative aggregation of risk due to various sources is a complex process, which warrants such an approach.
Fuzzy logic provides a language with syntax and semantics to translate qualitative knowledge into numerical reasoning. In many engineering problems, the information about the probabilities of various risk items is vaguely known or assessed. The term computing with words has been introduced by Zadeh (1996) to explain the notion of reasoning linguistically rather than with numerical quantities. Such reasoning has a central importance for many emerging technologies related to engineering and applied sciences.
When evaluating risk items in complex systems, decision-makers, engineers, managers, regulators and other stake-holders often view risk in terms of linguistic variables like very high, high, very low, low etc. The fuzzy set theory is able to deal effectively with these types of uncertainties (encompassing vagueness), and linguistic variables can be used to approximate reasoning and subsequently manipulated to propagate the uncertainties throughout the decision process. Fuzzy-based techniques are a generalized form of interval analysis used to address uncertain and/or imprecise information. A fuzzy number describes the relationship between an uncertain quantity x and a membership function µ, which ranges between 0 and 1. A fuzzy set is an extension of the traditional set theory (in which x is either a member of set A or not) in that an x can be a member of set A with a certain degree of membership µ. Fuzzy-based techniques can help in addressing deficiencies inherent in binary logic and are useful in propagating uncertainties through models. Any shape of a fuzzy number is possible, but the selected shape should be justified by available information. Generally, triangular fuzzy numbers (TFN) or trapezoidal fuzzy numbers (ZFN) are used for representing linguistic variables (Lee 1996) . Table   1 provides commonly used arithmetic operations for two TFNs A and B. Details of these arithmetic manipulations are described by Klir and Yuan (1995) . Defuzzification is a process to evaluate a crisp or point estimate of a fuzzy number. A defuzzified number is generally represented by centroid, often determined using the moment of area method (Yager 1980) . Let the likelihood r of failure be defined by the triangular fuzzy number TFN r and the consequence (or peril) l of failure be defined by TFN l . The table in Figure 2 describes an 11-grade (or 11-granulars) qualitative scaling system for both factors r and l (as suggested by
Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks Lee 1996) . This 11-grade scale for likelihood includes absolutely low, extremely low, quite low, low, mildly low, medium, mildly high, high, quite high, extremely high and absolutely high. In addition, to represent a nil event i.e., if some phenomenon is surely absent, the q may be assigned a value of 0. For example if water distribution system does not have plastic pipes and other plastic components, likelihood of permeation will be 0. Similarly, an 11-grade scale for peril includes absolutely unimportant, extremely unimportant, quite unimportant, unimportant, mildly unimportant, neutral, mildly important, important , quite important, extremely important and absolutely important. The objective of using 11-grade scale is to provide a decision-maker more flexibility in expressing linguistic notions of likelihood and consequences (peril) comprehensively. The membership functions of r and l to their respective granulars are defined as: 
where x r is a continuous (latent) but uncertain variable for r, µ q r (x r ) is the function defining the membership of x r to granular q, x l is a continuous (latent) variable for l, µ q l (x l ) is the function defining the membership of x l to granular q, and q denotes a granular (or a scale variable, or grade) of the fuzzy numbers. Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks that likelihood/peril is 70% mildly low and 30% medium. The TFN definitions can be changed or modified based on expert recommendations or on Delphi method-based surveys (Lee and Kim, 2001 ).
Failure risk is defined as the product of the fuzzy numbers denoting r and l (see Table 1 for the definition of the product of two TFNs), which is equivalent to defining risk as the joint probabilities of occurrence and consequences provided the representative probabilities are independent. By definition, the product of two TFNs is itself a TFN. Let TFN r be defined by the members (a r , b r , c r ) and TFN l by (a l , b l , c l ). The risk TFN rl for these r and l is then calculated by
The membership function µ rl (x rl ) of TFN rl is defined in the interval (a r * a l ) ≤ x rl ≤ (c r * c l ). In line with using qualitative linguistic variables, a scale system for risk is discretized in seven grades (or granulars), namely, extremely low (EL), quite low (QL), low (L), medium (M), high (H), quite high (QH) and extremely high (EH). For simplicity these risk granulars are denoted L 1 through L 7 , respectively. Failure risk obtained in (equation 2) cannot be directly mapped into the 7-grade risk scale described above because it is derived from two TFNs with 11 granulars each.
Instead, risk needs to be defuzzified and then the defuzzified value remapped into the 7-grade risk scale using the appropriate membership functions.
Various techniques for defuzzification are available, the most common of which are -Chen's ranking (1985) and Yager's centroid (1980) methods. In this paper, the centroid method is used for defuzzification due to its simplicity.
Defuzzified risk = Figure 3 depicts the risk contours representing g(r,l) for all possible combinations of r and l. As can be expected, these contours show risk values that are increasing from left to right and bottom to top (i.e., with the increase in either likelihood or peril, individually or simultaneously).
Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks These defuzzified risk factors g(r,l) now need to be mapped into the 7-grade risk scale described above. The membership function of this 7-grade risk scale is defined by , where the denominators are the names of the corresponding granulars. Note that equation 4 dictates that the sum of memberships to the various granulars is unity (normalized fuzzy membership), however, this was done for convenience and cardinality of fuzzy sets does not require that this condition be essential.
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The Hierarchical Structure Model and Risk Aggregation Figure 5 and Table 2 illustrate the basic building blocks of the hierarchical structural model. Essentially, each risk item is partitioned into its contributory factors which are also risk items, and each of those can be further partitioned into lower level contributory factors. The unit consisting of a risk factor ("parent") and its contributory factors ("children") is called "family".
A family consists of two generations but each of the children can be further partitioned into children of the next generation. A risk element with no children is called "basic risk item", while the term risk item or risk attribute are interchangeably used for all elements with offspring.
The notation for a risk item or attribute is X i,j k , where i is the ordinal number of risk item X in the current generation; j is the ordinal number of the parent (in the previous generation); and k is the generation order of X. In Table 2, The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is a technique commonly used for multiple-criteria analysis. The AHP develops a linear additive model, which derives weights by performing pairwise comparisons between criteria or attributes (Ziara et al. 2002) . Table 3 depicts a 9-level scale of relative importance used in this process of pair-wise comparisons. The comparison results are then arranged into a reciprocal matrix (Saaty 1996; Sadiq et al. 2003) which is subsequently used to calculate the implied weights. These weights are normalized to a sum of 1, such that in any generation (k), for n siblings for a given parent j, a set of weights W k j can be written as
W
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Aggregation of fuzzy sets require operations by which several fuzzy numbers are combined in a desirable way to produce a single fuzzy number (Klir and Yuan 1995) . The literature reflects numerous ways and operators to aggregate fuzzy sets, e.g., intersection, minimum, product (also known as fuzzy t-norms) and union, maximum, summation (also known as s-norms). The aggregation process in fault tree analysis uses probabilistic type of intersections (and gate) and unions (or gate) (e.g., see Khan et al. 2002) . Other common operators for aggregation are arithmetic, geometric and harmonic means. In addition, there is a class of averaging operators, generalized means, which provides flexible aggregation operators ranging between the minimum and the maximum operators. Another class of aggregation operators includes the ordered weighted averaging operators (OWA). Detailed discussions on the selection of appropriate aggregation operators are given by Klir and Yuan (1995) , and Smolikova and Wachowiak (2001) . In this study, the weighted average technique was used to aggregate risk.
The process of evaluating aggregative risk in a fundamental unit (i.e., "family") of the aggregative structure can now be summarized, using the family ( For ease of manipulation these 7-tuple fuzzy sets can be arranged in a fuzzy assessment matrix (FAM), which is a 3 × 7 matrix F(X i,2 3 ), where the index j = 2 stands for siblings of parent item number 2 in the previous generation. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is then applied and weights W 3,2 3 , W 4,2 3 , W 5,2 3 are evaluated and arranged into a 3-member vector. The aggregative risk (or parent or risk attribute) of the three siblings is a 7-tuple fuzzy set X 2,1 2 which is calculated It should be pointed out here that the process of evaluating r and l and re-mapping the product risk into the 7-grade risk scale, is done only for basic risk items (those risk items which do not have children). Consequently it is useful to use notation that distinguishes between basic and non-basic risk items. In the remainder of this paper, the notation for a basic risk item will include an apostrophe at the generation index, i.e., if item X 4,2 3 is a basic risk item, it will be denoted
. It should also be noted that in the first generation of the structure (i.e., the head of the pyramid) the final aggregative risk can be defuzzified to provide a single (crisp) measure of the risk of the entire structure. This can be done by
where L G is the 7-member vector defined in Figure 4 . The defuzzified risk is calculated as a dot product of vector L G and fuzzy number X 1,0 1 .
Knowledge Acquisition
Knowledge acquisition is required to explore and develop relationships between basic risk items and events of occurrence. For example, the age of a pipe can be associated with its breakage rate and thus to the likelihood of contaminants' intrusion in case of maintenance events. Similarly, contamination due to treatment breakthrough can be associated with the treatment method, demand in peak hours, etc. Knowledge acquisition consists of four distinct activities: preliminary analysis; literature review; surveys/interviews and solicitations of opinions of an expert panel.
The preliminary analysis helps to obtain an overview of the problem and determine potential modular categories that would be useful in classifying various types of risks. The preliminary analysis breaks down the risk items along categorical lines, which help identify contributory risk factors (McCauley-Bell and Badiru 1996) . For water quality in distribution networks this analysis could be carried out along the contamination pathways as illustrated in Figure 1 . An indepth literature review follows the preliminary analysis. The result of this analysis provides a
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An Application of the Proposed Methodology -A Hypothetical Case Study
Water quality failure
Intrusion of contaminants in the water distribution system can occur through pipes and storage tanks. Open finished water reservoirs are susceptible to microbial contamination from external non-point sources such as feces of infected animals, e.g., beaver, squirrels and rabbits, within the watershed. Microorganisms can be introduced into open reservoirs from windblown dust, debris, and algae. Organic matter (leaves and pollens) are also of concern in open storage tanks (Kirmeyer et al. 2001) . Finished water can also be affected in covered facilities by airborne microorganisms entering through access hatches, overflow pipes and vents, roofs and side walls (Kirmeyer et al. 2001) . Microorganisms can also be introduced into ground level storage through surface water (flooding) or groundwater infiltration. Bird droppings are commonly found in storage facilities with floating covers (Clark et al. 1997 ).
Intrusion of contaminants through water mains may occur during maintenance and repair events, through broken pipes and gaskets, and cross connections. A broken gasket that seals pipe joints can be a pathway for variety heterotrophic bacteria in the distribution network (Geldreich 1990 ).
Regular maintenance and repair events as well as other anthropological and natural disasters may cause intrusion of contaminants in the water distribution network.
Cross connections (an unprotected physical connection between a potable and a non-potable water system) can potentially introduce substances that may compromise the quality of potable water. Backflow from cross connections may occur when the pressure inside the water main is less than the pressure at the entry point. This can happen when a water main breaks and is depressurized for breakage repair, or when peak demands occurs, or when an outside pressurized source is connected to the potable water system or without backflow protection (Kirmeyer et al. 2001) . Contamination events can also occur as a result of transient pressures in the distribution system, where negative or low pressures cause backflow into distribution mains.
Biofilm is defined as a deposit consisting of microorganisms, microbial products and detritus at the surface of pipes or tanks. Biological regrowth occurs when injured bacteria pass from the treatment plant into the distribution system and subsequently rejuvenate and grow in storage tank, and water mains. The regrowth of organisms in the distribution system increases chlorine demand of the system, thus reducing the level of free chlorine, which may hinder the system's ability to contend with local occurrences of contamination (US EPA 1999).
Disinfection is the primary method to inactivate pathogens. Chlorine has been highly successful Permeation is a phenomenon in which the contaminants migrate through the pipe wall. Three stages are observed in physico-chemical process of permeation: (a) organic chemicals present in the soil partition between the soil and plastic wall, (b) the chemicals defuse through the pipe wall, and (c) the chemicals partition between the pipe wall and the water inside the pipe (Kleiner 1998 ). Holsen et al. (1991) has reported that most of the permeation events occur where the soil
Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks is contaminated with gasoline, diesel fuel, or solvents. Thompson and Jenkins (1987) have reported that polyethylene pipes are potentially susceptible to permeation of non-polar organic compounds. Similarly, all elastomeric and thermo-plastic materials are prone to permeation. In general, the risk of contamination through permeation is relatively small compared to other mechanisms.
Red water is one the most common causes of water quality failure although the peril is a loss of aesthetics rather than health. The corrosion of metallic pipes and plumbing devices increases the concentration of metal compounds in the water. Different metals go through different corrosion processes, but in general low pH water, high dissolved oxygen, high temperature, and high levels of dissolved solids increase corrosion rates. Heavy metals such as lead and cadmium may also leach into the water from the pipe materials. Secondary metals such as copper (from home plumbing), iron (distribution pipes) and zinc (galvanized pipes) may leach into water and cause taste, odor and color problems in addition to minor health related risks (Kleiner 1998 ).
Contamination of water by compounds leached from pipe liners (plastic and epoxy lining) has also been observed. Aschengrau et al. (1993) has explored the exposure of perchloroethylene (PCE) to human population and linked it to occurrence of cancer cases. Kirmeyer et al. (2001) assembled an expert panel to rank pathogen (contaminant) entry. Each member on the expert panel was given a number of votes and instructed to identify and rank (at three qualitative levels of low, medium and high) the most important routes of entry. Additional routes of pathogen entry have been included in Table 4 to reflect different pipe materials and security concerns. Figure 6 shows a simplified hierarchical structure for water quality failure. This structure is used to demonstrate the aggregative risk framework introduced earlier. Table 5 lists the 17 basic risk items for the proposed structure. These basic risk items are grouped into third generation risk attributes, which in turn are grouped into second generation risk attributes including intrusion, regrowth, water treatment related, permeation and leaching. A more elaborate structure could, for example, partition the basic risk item, broken pipes into pipe age groups, material, surrounding soil types etc. Similarly, risks due to disinfection by products (DBPs) can be broken down into specific species like trihalomethanes (THMs) and haloacetic acids (HAAs), and THMs can be
Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks further broken down to chloroform, bromoform, etc. Various local and regional factors (e.g., geographical location, type of water treatment, climate, size and age of distribution system, soil/topography, rehabilitation and frequency of flushing programs and others) affect the magnitude of both r and l for each basic risk item. A step-by-step process for estimating aggregative risk of water quality failure is shown in Figure 7 . The weight matrices W i,j k for each set of siblings were developed using an AHP technique as discussed in section 3. The estimated weights are summarized in Table 6 .
First stage risk aggregation
The first stage aggregation process is applied only to basic risk items. For each basic risk item, r and l are assigned q-grade value and then defuzzified risk g(r i,j
) is obtained using Figure 3 .
This process is summarised in Table 5 for all the basic risk items in the suggested simplified structure. It should be noted that a basic risk item can be in any generation in the hierarchical , the defuzzified risk value against g(5, 9) is equal to 0.325 (using Figure 3) 
After this process is applied to all the families which include basic risk items, the fuzzy risk 
(13)
Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks Equation (13), also called a possibility mass function, is plotted in Figure 8 . The final defuzzified aggregative risk is determined by the multiplication of the centroids of membership functions L G and the 7-tuple fuzzy set X 1,0 1 as in equation (7). In this example, the final defuzzified risk is
. The results of the analyses are summarized in Table 7 .
Discussion
In hierarchical (multiple-level) aggregation processes, recognition of two potential pitfalls namely exaggeration and eclipsing is important. Exaggeration occurs when all basic risk items are of relatively low risk, yet the final aggregative risk comes out unacceptably high. Eclipsing is the opposite phenomenon, where one or more of the basic risk items is of relatively high risk, yet the estimated aggregative risk comes out as unacceptably low. These phenomena are typically affected by the aggregation method used, thus the challenge is to determine the best aggregation method which will simultaneously reduce both exaggeration and eclipsing.
Aggregation operators used for the development of environmental indices generally include additive forms (simple addition, arithmetic average, weighted average), root sum power, root sum square, maximum, multiplicative forms (e.g., geometric mean, weighted product), and minimum operators (Silvert 2000; Somlikova and Wachowiak 2001; Ott 1978) . Model predictions may be sensitive to both the types of aggregation operators as well as to weights.
Generally, a sensitivity analysis (step 9 in Figure 7 ) is conducted to quantify the change in output caused by changes in input values. In the proposed framework the sensitivity analysis should be extended to examine the effects of weights and aggregation operators as well. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis will depend on the actual values of the specific case at hand. As the case study presented here is but a simplified example with hypothetical values, applying such a sensitivity analysis here would be of little value.
The application of the proposed hierarchical aggregative risk approach has several benefits and advantages:
• It enables the synthesis of both quantitative and qualitative information into a single framework;
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• It can explicitly consider and propagate uncertainties inherent in linguistic expressions throughout the hierarchical structure;
• Its modular form is scalable; enabling it to accommodated new knowledge and information, such as vulnerability to terrorist acts (safety related risk), hydraulic failure, financial risk etc.;
• It can be used to conduct cost-benefit analyses to facilitate effective budget allocation and prioritize attention required to components that have the most adverse impact on total system risk. For example, assume an aggregative risk of a water distribution system is evaluated as low to medium but the level of "acceptable risk" is defined as quite low to low by a regulatory agency. Furthermore, assume that it is found that two basic risk items are responsible for these higher risk values. The proposed hierarchical aggregative risk approach can then be used to re-evaluate if the "rehabilitation" of the two risk items will lead to a decrease in the aggregative risk to an acceptable regulatory level of quite low to low. Subsequently, the costs of both of these options can be examined and the most economical option can be selected for application.
• More data results in reduced uncertainty, which, when propagated through the hierarchical structure, can result in reduced uncertainty in aggregative risk. The proposed approach can help pinpoint areas where more data would yield increased benefits. For example, a basic risk item with very high peril (l) but very low likelihood (r) is not as good as a candidate for further investigation as a risk item of medium peril and medium likelihood, even though the risks of both items are likely to be similar.
• It is easily programmable for computer applications and can become a risk analysis tool for a water distribution system; The limitations of the proposed method are:
• It may be sensitive to the selection of aggregation operators. Different operators can be used for different segments of the model. Trial and error approach may be required to avoid exaggeration and eclipsing; and Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks
• This framework accommodates both qualitative and quantitative data. Some data may be supported by rigorous observations, while other data may be based on loosely supported or anecdotal-based beliefs. These two types of data should have different weights in the aggregation process. The hierarchical structure in its current form does not address this need to distinguish between data obtained from sources of different reliabilities.
The structure presented in this paper is a simplified application of the approach. A comprehensive structure would require a major effort, including the collaboration of several experts in the various disciplines of knowledge.
Summary and Conclusions
The water in distribution networks can be contaminated via several pathways. The quantification and characterization of the various risk factors in water distribution systems is a complex process. Thousands of kilometers of pipes of different ages and materials, uncertain operational and environmental conditions, unavailability of reliable data, and lack of understanding of some factors and processes affecting pipe performance make it extremely challenging.
In this study, an approach is developed to estimate aggregative risk from various sources and pathways. Risk is defined as a product of likelihood and peril, where both factors are expressed in terms of qualitative scales (defined by fuzzy numbers). A modular hierarchical model is developed to provide a framework for aggregating risk items of water quality failure. An analytic hierarchy process is used for the aggregation of the risk factors. Weighted average operators are used for grouping various risk items and attributes that may be expressed in non-commensurate units. The selection of appropriate aggregation operators can be challenging. Future research should develop an elaborate system, including expert panels, and processes for the selection of the most appropriate aggregation operators.
In the model development stages, the final aggregative risk value is expected to have limited meaning for the acceptability of risk by public. It is envisaged that as this hierarchical structure is developed, populated and subsequently improved upon (using newly obtained data) the developers will gain insight into risk levels as they are manifested in the final fuzzy and/or defuzzified risk values. Local and regional factors (e.g., geographical location, climate, size and age of distribution system, soil/topography, rehabilitation and frequency of flushing programs and others) can be used to decide magnitude for both factors r and l for each basic risk item. In the longer terms, this approach could serve as a basis for bench marking acceptable risks in water distribution system. In the future research, the authors of this paper will attempt to collect real data from different distribution systems to demonstrate the applicability of this approach.
A similar hierarchical framework can be created where the values propagated up the structures are symptoms (e.g., minor illnesses) rather risk values. Such a framework could be used for diagnostic/forensic purposes, where for example, a number of reported minor illnesses could be attributed to the most likely cause, such as intrusion or microbial regrowth. Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks 
List of Symbols
Risk evaluation scale, L p µ L p (x L ) EL = L 1 QL = L 2 L = L 3 M = L 4 H = L 5 EH = L 7 QH = L 6 x L = 0.11 µ L 1 (0.11) = 0.35 µ L 2 (0.11) = 0.65 Granular L 1 L 2 L 3 L 4 L 5 L 6 L 7 TFN rl
STEP-7
Evaluate the final defuzzified risk
STEP-8
Evaluate final stage aggregative risk item:
Evaluate intermediate stage aggregative risk items:
Develop fuzzy assessment matrices F(X i, j 4 )
STEP-6
Estimate weights W i, j k for basic risk items and risk attributes for each generation using analytical hierarchy process ( 
STEP-2
Development of a general hierarchical structure for risk STEP-1
Sensitivity analysis STEP-9
Evaluate first stage aggregative risk items: Table 3 . Fundamental scale used to developing priority matrix for AHP (Saaty, 1988) Regrowth of biofilm in pipes and sloughing 2 7 0.065 
1.000
Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks Aggregative risk analysis for water quality failure in distribution networks
